



the pattern atlas of system vulnerabilities


PETER STOYKO RSD11 SYMPOSIUM UNIVERSITY OF BRIGHTON BRIGHTON, UK

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




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how SMALL players change **BIG** systems

SMALL MOVER STRATAGEMS



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ILLUSTRATIVE
VISUAL ANCHORSENS
CONC

concept-driven inquiry

SENSITIZINGATTENTIONALCONCEPTSSENSITIZATION






magnets for the mind






system sight


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






VISUAL VOCABULARY **OF SYSTEMS**













common language


















casetwo



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case three









case four










messy entanglement








control attempts



REGULAR DISRUPTIONS

NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES

CHRONIC DIFFICULTIES








domino effects






levels of scale






TIME SCALES


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	Outer		РЕТА		Geologic Time (Chrons to Eons)
\sim			TERA		Millennia
	Above, Over	HYPER SCALE	GIGA		Decades-Centuries
	Very Large		MEGA		Months -Years
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	Experiential Proportions		MOMENT		Experiential Proportions
	Miniscule		CENTI	•••	Reflex response
			MILLI	••• •••	Neuron firing
	Tiny	H Y P O S C A L E	MICRO	••	Latency of optical computer networks
	VeryTiny		NANO	••••	Laptop (GHz) micro- processor cycle
			PICO	•••	Fastest micro- processor cycle
\sim	Elemental		FEMTO	••	Ultraviolet-light wave cycle
			ATTO	•	Finest timing control of lasers
$\langle \cdot \rangle$	Extreme Smallness		ZEPTO		Electron oscillation cycle
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PERIODIC







SECULAR


CHANGE

pace layers






NON -PERIODIC



DISJUNCTIVE






MESSES **COMPLEX SYSTEM INTER-RELATIONS**

FIBERS ROUTINES AND SUB-ROUTINES

tangle metaphor




ENTANGLEMENTS CROSS-SYSTEM DYNAMICS

THREADS SYSTEMS AND **SUB-SYSTEMS**

vulnerabilities



OF SCALE
























































(KNOT)

ICON & VISUAL ANALOGY

SHORTHAND DESCRIPTOR


visual placeholder




SYSTEM CRUFT & KLUDGE

CAUSE OF VULNERABILITY





MESSES COMPLEX SYSTEM INTER-RELATIONS



FIBERS ROUTINES AND SUB-ROUTINES

atlas

ENTANGLEMENTS **CROSS-SYSTEM** DYNAMICS

THREADS SYSTEMS AND SUB-SYSTEMS





V. 1.O.O BY PETER STOYKO

the (n)ever-changing world paradox

less control on elaborate systems than is

less control on elaborate systems than is commonly assumed. Much change (and change-averse dissembling) happens among continually adjusting routines and subroutines. Even high-reliability organiza-tions (such as nuclear powerplants) struggie to manage variability. Routines executed by humans are inherently vari-able and may not be strictly prescribed to begin with. Thought and effort go into applying routines to slightly different situations. Even standardized 'low skill' mutines are 'nenformative' demanding

routines are "performative," demanding

adjustments. A routine may not get the job done under the circum- stances, trigger-

ing a "repair" of the routine or a switch to

regularities. In undirected social systems,

loosely framed. Social interactions across the system may settle into more or less

stable patterns but the underlying churn

Conversely, routines may adapt so that systems stay the same more generally. Do evolving routines maintain the **status quo** by allowing a flawed system to persist? Or are changes gradually altering the system's overall character and purpose, turning it into something else? It can be hard to fell when cannot the withing a

hard to tell when caught up within a

system's operations and lacking the

critical distance to see things from a

causes both gradual drift and the

occasional abrupt shift.

broader perspective.

many routines are imitative, habitual, and

keen attention to details and imp

another one. New routines may be

nvented in response to emerging

system entanglements

As Donella Meadows explains, "A system levels of scale. Different dangers are visible by zooming into each level. Some As uponelia Meadows explains, 'A system is a set of things – people, cells, mole-cules, or whatever – interconnected in such a way that they produce their own pattern of behavior over time." I Few systems are entirely "closed" insofar as vulnerabilities are the product of mes as a whole (#). Others are caused by ent systems (2). Some vulnerabilities they do not draw inputs from elsewhere most rely on resources or signals coming systems (
). And some persist amor from outside their outer boundaries in outines and sub-routines (#). In keeping order to operate. Thus, systems are not with the metaphor, visuals are made of ust organized wholes made of intercontorted and tangled threads. Cascading errors and confounds at one level of scale may trigger problems at other levels. That is how a tiny mishap onto amplified into a machine disactor. onnected parts but are connected to each other in **elaborate tangles**. Some entanglements are tightly-coupled, non-substitutable, on-going dependencies. othen levels. Inter a lower stury listing of gets amplified into a massive disaster. For example, a software bug in the alarm system of a company's control-room once triggered a blackout that lasted for days, not just in the local area, but across a large swath of North America. A botched software update to an internet router at a telecommunications company caused Others are loose, tenuous, short-lived interactions. A lot of relational variety can exist between those poles. When we talk about a broader amalgam of systems (such as a society, economy, organization or ecosystem), we are talking about com-plex, evolving webs of entanglement. Once a society organizes itself beyond a Canada's entire debit-payment system to ninimal level of complexity, the webs of stop working for a day, with a third of all mobile phones losing coverage too. A nent become an irresolvable mess. A "mess" is Russell Ackoff's term for deadly bat virus infected a wild animal volving relations that are too numerous, sold in an urban market in China, with the varied, and obscurred to be coordinated.² Each system has unpredictable knock-on contagion spreading to humans, many of whom then traveled internationally, causinfluences on other systems. Messes can ing systems in various countries to shut be a good thing as variability is a source down for months to limit further spread. Then it happened again on a global scale. of resilience in complex environments: a Most disruptions and chronic difficulties Most disruptions and chronic difficulties are less spectacular. Indeed, system **glitches and gotchas** frustrate us on a daily basis. The rhetoric of technological progress promised a world of effortless disruptive event is less likely to affect all ystems and interrelations in the same way. There is also more experimentation and intellectual diversity to act as a hedge and interactual interactions with the action of the application of the progress promised a world of effortless convenience and human flourishing. Instead, biased, manipulative and errorprone systems are ever more proscripti and exacting. Those with atypical wants for coping. System shortcomings creat The Pattern Atlas of System Vulnerabilities countless episodes of suffering that itemizes the different types of vulner-ability inherent to elaborate, entangled, garner little attention. The cumulative impact of slow-boiling, behind-the-scenes human-made systems. It visually explores harms makes the mess less and less the idea of messy entanglement to identify the particular patterns that cause trouble. The mess is broken down into four

What causes systems to **change**? Systems are not static but are full of

Systems are not static but are full of moving parts. So what causes a system to work differently? To have different goals? To adapt to different seemins, cater to different needs? When com-plaints are made about systems being rigid, obsolete, or harmful, that is the sort of question raised. However, given all the energy and effort needed to keep every-thing going, a more relevant question may be: What causes a system to remain more rules stable? Come to think of it. how

or less stable? Come to think of it, how

onus of the question can reveal much more about a system's potential to evolve.

Recursion

Less More (Precision) (Flexibility)

Human-made systems are often made up

of operational routines and cycles of routines. We think of **routines** as fixed,

automatic, and repetitive sets of tasks. Yet they do not repeat per se, they *recur*:

Yet they do not repeat per se, they recur: routines have the potential to be some-what different with each implementation depending on how precise the operations have to be engineered. Conformist social systems can also have little tolerance for variation that breaks cherished norms, customs, or rules. A system's recurrence can seem like a consistent pattern because we usually lack fixed reference points with which to gauge change over time. Our inherent change blindness (see enonsite name) and the sheare volume of

posite panel) and the sheer volume of

racked using recorded data. Even so, our npression of system change is highly elective. Some parts always seem to be always evolving. Other parts seem stuck in the same recurring patterns. The con-

scape our attention unless they are

or free from the project web site.

Rights. This version of the Pattern Atlas is

stable is each system? Reversing the

HAYWIRED Routines that are co

HAYHIRED Routines that are circular, contradictory, or result in dead-ends are called Kafka circuits⁵. They are usually caused by an unforeseen irregularities or careless design. They are usually caused by an unforeseen irregularities or careless design. They result in ordeals for system users; that is, burdensome sub-routines to resolve matters that are full of exit tacks and delays; any of which may lead to further errors. Ideally, administrators have enough discretion to step outside of a routine to implement a pragmatic, one-off fix. Not every situation can be prefigured and turned into a set routine. Many systems do not allow for pragmatic fixes due to automation or because discretion opens the door to petty corruption. Without clear avenues for resolution, those caught up in an ordeal have to fend for themselves (hence the Kafka reference). Some-times an "ordeal mechanism" (or "micro-ordeal") is added on purpose to dis-courage system use (or overse) for political reasons or to manage capacity. ourage system use (or overuse) for political reasons or to manage capacity

DISCONNECTED

s systems become compartmentalized, they rely on hand-off routines etween modular subsystems. That comes with the risk of botched hand-offs. For example, information may not be shared between subsystems to provide a continuous flow of successive routines. Those caught up on the system may have to re-enter information or explain their predicament over and over as they are bounced from one routine to the next. The risk of data re-entry errors and are budiced role routine to the next, the risk of that are entry entry and other glitches increases. Sometimes a case will all through the cracks, stuck in a state of limbo, ideally, a system creates a "seamless" experience whereby transitioning between sub-system becomes invisible to observers. However, any fumble in a seamless handoff will be disorienting, as it is not clear what triggered the error. Thus, some systems are made "seamlu" whereby the hand-offs become more overt and elaborate, usually with other costs.

OPAQUE ?

ual systems and sub

Routines may be automated for efficiency. "Black-box" automation converts operations into elaborate algorithms, with the inscrutability of software code and statistical techniques making it difficult to see what is going on. Automation misfires regularly, for often three is no substitute for human judgement and discretion. Dodgy decision-making gimmicks and shoddy work can get encoded into algorithms that are too readily trusted. Contentious decisions also get laundered through algorithms that are hard to scrutinize. Algorithms are becom-ing more data intensive with data drawn from sources with poor quality control and dubious provenance. Ideally, technology augments human control and offers information. Yet the trend is towards removing human steering entirely. When the messy world is oversimplified to suit algorithms and operations become opaquely overcomplicated, glitches become nearly impossible to trouble-shoot.

RIGGED-UP Many routines are while adding hurde

RIGGED-UP Many routines are designed to make the job easier for system administrators while adding burdens on users, whose needs and circumstances are an after-thought. Some routines encourage over-use or misuse of the system in ways that benefit vested interests, administrators included. For example, as twan Illich argues, the medical system encourages over-consumption and many treatments are designed for the convenience of providers regardless of their suitability for patients.⁷ That results in an increase in provider induced harms (*atrogenesis*), including routine mistakes, unnecessary risk-exposure, and the force-fitting of atypical patients into standard routines. Some treatments may be based on contrived needs and promote unhealthy dependence. These sorts of vulnerabilities can be difficult to wered out because fixes remove admin-istrative conveniences and violate the mental models of those running things. istrative conveniences and violate the mental models of those running things

 Systems designed to indirectly control human variability rely on behavioral manipulation routines. Some routines psychologically "nudge" people into making particular choices using subtle prompts. Other routines "gamify" activities by inducing addictive habits with the emotional satisfaction of token rewards, such as points or "likes." Some attunement to human psychology is inevitable to better align systems with the ways humans naturally think. Even so, these "choice architectures" second-guess decisions for entire segments of these "choice architectures" second-guess decisions for entire segments of people. The potential for exploitation never goes away. Indeed, dark-pattern nudges and addictive habits are common. Outdated, dysfunctional nudges are a form of cruft called "sludge." Competing manipulations create unanticipated and contradictory behavioral patterns. Leeriness builds up and defensive behaviors emerge (*reactance*), which cause future manipulations to perform erratically.

CORRALLING Both coercions and indi Both coercions and indirect manipulations can create herding behaviors that commit large swaths of a population to the same behavioral patterns. A lack of variability can be a vulnerability, as diversity is a hedge against uncertainty and disruptive events. For example, routines that coax everyone into a few dietary habits can be risky if evidence about what is healthy and sustainable continues to evolve. Even if routines herd a small share of the nonulation, an induced harms to the cohort can have knock-on effects elsewhere in the system. That is the danger of "pushes," or behavioral manipulations combined with coercive measures. Unlike with "nudges," optionality is replaced with "managed autonomy," or constrained behavior that is strictly set to proscribed limits. If those limits are too narrow and ill-informed, then the herding behavio may causes those involved to become blindsided by unforeseen dangers.

COMPROMISED Routines may not be specified for functional reasons but are negotiated com-promises. Such *truces* may reduce internal tensions, even if no faction is fully satisfied (the *joint decision trap*) and one side is placated only half-heartedly. Conflicted administrators will "selectively perform" in ways that favor certain goals over others. Pretenses and token sub-routines may be added to give the false impression that a system is fulfilling certain functions while merely going through the motions. Defensive routines may build up to preserve a truce or protect turf. Those can block information signals that are crucial for a system's operations. Some routines may become "sanctified," imbueved with a larger meaning by a faction, causing any tampering or question- ing to be opposed. The build-up of compromised routines cause systems to lose their bearings.

IMITATION It's often assumed i

It's often assumed that there is a "right" way to doing things-a routine deemed a "best-practice" or "gold standard." Anti-patterns are approaches with a poor track record but are relied on anyway because of myths and prestige surround- ing them. It can be tempting to copy a well-regarded routine regardless of how suitable it is. Even if a routine shows promise, the system may not have the capability to implement it properly. In any case, such may not have the capation of uniperiment in property in any case, such in wannabe routines present a dilemma. Is the routine implemented, even if inappropriate? Or does everyone just go through the motions, while blocking any attempt to scrutinize short-comings too closely (*shielding*)? Are incorvenient or difficult parts dropped, even if that misses the whole point of the routine? Pantomimed, ill-fitting routines waste effort and disguise

HOOKED Routines may be

Routines may become *captured* by outsiders or another system. In other Routines may become captured by outsiders or another system. In other words, independence is comprimised as interests interfere with system functioning, otten in subtle and self-serving ways. For example, a routine may develop a dependency on an interest group for information or capabilities, exposing the system to outside pressures. Cosy relations may form between those working in a system and those regulated by it, causing favorable treatment within ostensibly neutral routines. A routine may pander to existing beneficiaries in a way that discriminates against prospective ones. These orruptions can shape a system, making its own logics and assumptions useparable from those of outside interests. Thus, interests get their hooks into the system even if the stated goals of the system overall do not change





OVER-EXTENDED Attempts to simplify mess

OVER-EXTENDED Attempts to simplify messy entanglements of systems into an intelligible coher-ence, instead of accept the messy world as it is, soon hit limits of capability. Making messes easier to interpret inevitably relies on "thin simplifications," or crude classification scheme sthat do a poor job of accurately capturing the salient (and continually evolving) variation.⁹ Government and corporate systems attempting oversight tend to be fragmented patchworks of capability, with less capable units dragging down more capable ones. Interventions trying to stream-line messes often wind up adding more complexity and unanticipated dynamics. A "clean up" is not even possible as amalgams of systems (such as a society or ecosystem) become irresolvable messes if they exceed a minimal level of complexity. Incapable systems with ambitious mess-management goals are accidents waiting to happen and are blind to the dysfunctions they introduce. accidents waiting to happen and are blind to the dysfunctions they in

PRECARIOUS Systems attempting I ment will activate con


Systems attempting to act as a bulwark against chaotic disorder in the environ-ment will *actively conserve* vulnerability to occasional disasters and chronic misfortunes, tilting the risk towards those with less power.⁹ For example, homes in low-lying areas seem safe due to elaborate drainage systems and water-containment barriers until the once-a-generation flood hits. Fighting all forest fires to protect nearby properties curtails the routine clearance of tinder fror the forest floor, making subsequent fires bigger, hotter, and more destructive. Law enforcement agencies mandate weak software security to make it easier to spy on criminals, which is a vulnerability for everyone that criminals then exploit. When disaster strikes, hazard-prome systems will double-down on underschilturconsenzation buriling on ome controls (control (corrol) vulnerability conservation by piling on more controls (control creep) instead o rethinking arrangements due to the sunk costs and escalating risk narratives.

UNIFORM Messes can be a good thing insofar as variation brings resilience. A variety of systems can better complement the complex environments in which they operate. Experimentation and diversity of thought act as a hedge against uncertainty; placing multiple bets is how uncertainty and chance are worked with constructively. However, a singular "best" way of doing things may take root across systems. Nascent evidence may even become baked into long-term regulations, contracts, voluntary standards, and formal routines, rigidities which then block evidence from being updated. Cookie-cutter approaches are cheapen gasier to maintain and mirket to recale. However, as ach "best of cheaper, easier to maintain, and quicker to scale. However, as each "best of breed" system and "best practice" is replicated, any underlying flaws and contextual misfits get replicated just as quickly, leaving every copy vulnerable to exploit- ation. That is the danger posed by monocultures of systems.

PROPPED-UP A broken Here proken thread in a tangle will remain propped-up by other threads. Likewise A broken thread in a tangle will remain propped-up by other threads. Likewise, as systems become interdependent, the incentive is to prevent dissolution of failing systems or usher in a replacement right away. Systems that are 'too big to fail' or well-connected politically get the most support. That prevents a spell of bad fortunes from scuttling decades of building. Yet difficulties test the mettle of organizations and systems. Propping them up preserves weakness and encourages reckless and cynical risk-taking (moral hazard). Sketchy oper-ations then linger, their weaknesses obscured by the extended support. These are the "zombies", neither alive nor dead, just limping along at minimal viability; thwarting innovative upstarts trying to take their place, hording resources and talent better redeployed elsewhere, and otherwise preventing rejuvenation. Too many weak threads make the tangle vulnerable to large-scale disruption.

DEFERRED Humans tend to Humans tend to make short-sighted decisions that discount the future (bounded willpower) using imperfect information (bounded rationality) based on cultural framings of self-interest (bounded interest).¹⁰ Systematization is often sold as more purely rational. Yet systems can pander to human biases and amplify their effects, especially innovations that time-shift the costs of present activities. For example, debt-financing and economies of scale can accelerate resource extraction and consumption in the present, while deferring the cost burden to some unspecified future moment. System feedback may provide signals of long-term unsustainability. Some systems may adjust to achieve equilibrium (homeostasis). Insofar as these signals and constraints call for short-term sacifices, they may be supressed or ignored. Worse, the mess of systems often obscures and blocks feedback about long-term consequences.

UNTETHERED Systems can come to Systems can come to rely on the same abstractions, which become unterthered from the complex, underlying reality and take on a life of their own. That is an abstraction trap. For example, money is a medium of exchange that bestows an exchange value on goods and services, which can become disconnected with real-world use value. Likewise, interface metaphors and conventions make a system easier to use by relating their operations to more familiar objects. Insofar as abstractions become integral to a system, the risk is that the contrivance is forgotten (reified) and considered a direct representation of reality (misplaced concreteness). Most systems have at least one layer of abstraction to make it intelligible to users and administrators. These abstractions can become a recognizable aspect of culture that get reused in other systems, often inappropriately. The build-up of abstractions across systems then mask underlying dangers. Worse, as problems emerge, the usual reaction is not to question the accuracy and validity of the abstraction layers. Instead, attention turns to spurious rationalizations and blame games



MESSES

[Complex system inter-relations]

OVEREXTENDED

DEFERRED

PREGARIOUS PREGARIOUS UNIFORM

PROPPED UP

UNTETHERED

[Routines and sub-routines]

flicted sense that "every thing changes, every- thing stays the same" is called the (n)ever changing world paradox.³ Change efforts usually focus on decisions also offers possibilities for change for nade by high-ranking decision-makers. lop-down decisions-making has much those who are nimble and resourcef



 Project. The Pattern Atlas is a product of the SystemViz Project, an ongoing research study devoted to better explain-ing systems culture, foresight and govern-ance. For more, see: www.stoyko.net forthcoming book by Peter Stoyko, How Small Players Change Big Systems (2024).
 Additional products can be downloaded for free from the porject web site. Peter Stoyko, Pattern Atlas of System Vulnerabilities 1.0.0 – Poster (Ottawa: The SystemViz Project, 2022).

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A fault is a malfunction or error that impedes system activities or causes general failure. A confound is an unexpected, unwelcome factor persisting in a system or an unplanned-for case causing difficulties. These disruptions come in four general patterns, with each pattern having different implications for the way systems prepare and react.

 $\mathbf{O} \bigcirc \mathbf{O} \bigcirc \mathbf{O}$ Regular disruptions occur with predictable frequency and can be coped with by adding pre-cautions and recovery measures. Bedicated systems or sub-systems may be installed to routinize the handling of these disruptions. For example, an urban road network is an amalgam occordinated systems (traffic control. law enforcement, road maintenance, and so forth) designed for semi-autonomous systems (vehicle to pareate on. Occasional disruptions happen, su as vehicle crashes and snow storms. Bedicated systems prevent serious disruption (such as towing, ambulance, and snowplow services). Diperators of downstream systems may even have towing, ambulance, and snowplow services).


REGULAR

DISRUPTIONS

IRREGULAR

Irregular disruptions are rare events that cause a system from functioning. Some are catastrophic insofar as they cause significant damage to more than one system at a time, or cause a cascade of disruptions across interconnected systems. Emergency preparedness and disaster manage-ment are disciplines devoted to minimizing these DISRUPTIONS disruptions. That can include dedicated systems. Overly precise preparations usually get caught fla footed and ill-equipped because irregular disrup-tions are so quirky and rare. Precautions are over-ostimized for prevention the previous disruption

optimized for preventing the previous disruption Vigilance also wanes over time. Haphazard, ill-informed disaster responses that try to micro-



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$\neg \phi$

REINFORCING A reinforcing loop occu

REINFORCING A reinforcing loop occurs when system dynamics perpetuate a recurring pattern of activity. A negative reinforcement includes incentives, inducements, and persuasions that discourage particular actions, whereas positive reinforcement encourages actions. No system is perfect, so positive - and negative feedback signals are necessary to course correct by indicating what seems to work or not. Reinforcing loops tend to lock-in system activities by making divergence costly. Unlernabilities emerge when a system trajectory is not sustainable and creates serious harms, yet the reinforcing dynamics promote continuation. For example, system reinforcements may be optimized to achieve a narrow goal while creating all sorts of collateral damage for other systems. Or a group of systems reinforce each other in a way that perpetuates long-term harms. By the time the dynamics change, it may be too late to avoid irreversable destruction.

SPIRALING (@)

A downward (or vicious-) spiral occurs when system dynamics lead to a troublesome predicament, which gives rise to new dynamics that lead to more trouble, and so on until collapse happens. Each new set of dynamics makes it difficult to reverse course and recover from previous troubles. Often the only way to set things right is to create an upward (or virtuous-) spiral by changing the dynamics. That usually involves making short-term sacrifices and gaining the dyfatilities: That also addity involves mixing solution certifications and galaring support from elsewhere. Spiral dynamics tend to emerge because successive predicaments trigger troublesome dynamics within different systems. For example, a business may experience troubles in a supply chain that reduces cash flows, which trigger troubles from the financial system, which trigger operational cutbacks, which trigger reduced lemand in retail markets, which further reduce cash flows. Each system exacerbates troubles independently.

AMPLIFYING Risk amplifiers (or "bla (acceleration), Risks may be correlated, so when one trouble occurs, othe (acceleration), mass hay be contended, so when one thouse occurs, outers happen too, making the situation worse. Multiple amplifers create a nunaway effect ('doom loop'). Fallbacks include: "firewalls' to contain spread; "curcuit breakers" to shut things down temporarily; "shock absorbers" to impose delays; and reserves to absorb losses. Triggering these measures may cause a paric by signaling danger. Risks become "turbo charged" when system complexity obscures the potential for runaway effects, the adequacy of risk-management measures is hard to judge, and incentives encourage downplaying of dangers

EXTRACTING In a "platform ecosystem EXTRACTING In a "platform ecosystem," independent actors (complementors) built sub-systems atop a shared system. Think of popular social-media, e-commerce, and computer operating-system platforms. If the platform relies on a large network of users or massive economises of scale, a "winner-take-most" dynamic emerges as popularity breeds more popularity. Platform owners gain regulatory powers. Once a critical mass of dependecies is achieved, platform owners can become "takers instead of makers" by extracting rentw shile resting on their laurels. Siphoning resources away from innovators causes vitality to wane. Worse, entre domains that would otherwise be full of vibrant, free-wheeling diversity can become "platformized". Everything becomes reliant on a single system which, if it breaks, brings everyone else down too. There is less incentive to fix vulnerabili-ties on platform swith capitre dependents and insulated platform owners. ties on platforms with captive dependents and insulated platform owne

BARRON ///

Within natural ecosystems, an edge effect is the abundance of diversity and eraction happening in the space where one habitat abuts another. An example is the space dividing a forest from scrub lands or an undersea shelf where the depths meet the shallows. The liminal zones of societal tangles have edge effects too. For example, innovation tends to emerge amid dense networks between business, finance, and academic research clusters. Buzzing urban neighbourhoods supporting vibrant cultures tend to have a mix of civic ameni-ties, residents, and businesses. It is hard for beneficial spill-over effects (positive externalities) to happen between systems without the interactions that edges offer.¹¹ That is not true if there are too many edges, in which case certain types of actor may build up an advantage. Conversely, a barron network domain results if there are too few edges or intermingling is routinely blocked

>k< ENSNARLING

ENSNARLING Systems can get in each others way. For example, regulatory and legal systems govern other systems. Worthwhile restrictions are beneficial. However, the build-up of regulations can become unwieldy. Contradictions may never get reconciled. Compliance burdens grow. Knowing all the requirements can be impractical. Streamlining by removing unnecessary "red-tape" has become a kind of "forever war". Regulators keep it all working by exercising sensible judgement and avoiding cases of regulatory unreasonableness. That is difficult to do even-handedly. Established players may even lobby to preserve red-tape to block potential rivals. Systems can stiffe each other indirectly too. A domain may become cruwda with systems relative on a shared inforstructure (or may become crowded, with systems relying on a shared infrastructure (or super-system) with finite capacity. Designs have to account for congestion, especailly to avoid snarl-ups during peak periods and emergencie

CHAFING \prec

CHAFING Systems can be designed for parasitic exploitation, the chafing in the tangle. Doctorow & Giblin explain how many instrumental systems have embedded subsystems that impinge on use and spy on users.¹² For example, the dominant brand of tractors are full of sensors to gather information about farm conditions to trade commodifies. Not only does the data not help farms as independent systems but the trades go against their commercial interests. Each tractor also has a kill switch to prevent unauthorized repairs. Needless to say, vulnerability results when entire classes of system are not readily fixable and "curse" other systems that rely on them. Such parasitic systems can be more direct. For example, Michael Lewis tells how a consortium of Wall Street insiders built a sub-system to profit from price discrepancies between markets (*arbitrage*).¹³ A fiber-optics tunnel was built to detect trades and "flash trade" a fraction of a second ahead, costing the original trader a little extra. That is "rigging" the system in a very literal sense.



CRUFTY Cruftiness refers to departures from sound design principles that accumuate in systems as they age. If a system is not designed for ease-of-repair and on-going adaptation, it is "nursed along" with pragmatic fixes. The system departs from any sort of ideal configuration to become a knotted hodge-podge of parts. Crufy systems are full of *Mudges*; that is, makeshift patches, hacky work-arounds, sub-par trade-offs, and unnecessary dependencies. Cleaning up that "technical debt" is an thankless, arduous chore, which is why it is despainingly called "yak shaving." Experienced fixers keep systems going with heroic saves and more Mudges. Successful banci-alids remove any urgency to do major reno-vations or confront deeper dysfunctions. Lack of major disruption obscures chronic, low-level problems. Cruft utlimately overwhelms the ability of fixers to cope. Disruptions also increase as experienced fixers retire or change jobs.

QUIRKY

BUGGY

Crimps in the thread represent unanticipated interactions between parts that otherwise work as intended. Even if benign, an unanticipated interaction may combine with others to create a compounding error. Charles Perrow points out that designers cannot foresee all interactions within highly complicated systems nor between different systems that interact. There are too many per-widations on desphilations to repeating any with angled information. mutations and combinations to consider, even with perfect information. The Initiations and collinations to collective the work of percerch initiation of the first more interconnected and elaborate a system gets, the more susceptible it is to such "normal accidents."⁴⁴ Moreover, the quirky behaviors of the system that result do not fall tidlity within specialized disciplinary boundaries. Experts of various stripes have to put their heads together to diagnose problems. In so doing, they struggle to moderate disputes, allocate responsibility, and clear-up ambiguities because there are no established methods for that.

Bugs (flaws and faults) are inherent to system development. Most are quashed but a few inevitably remain. These kinks in the system are hard to track down because they are triggered by rare interactions and circumstances. The tricki-est to diagnose are technical flaws combined with faulty assumptions. Some are harder to find when looked for (observer influence). As software takes over more and more system tasks, bugs become a bigger threat. Unlike with other engine eering disciplines, workaday coders are slow to absorb advancements in praxis. To cut down on the "vulns," coders babysit one another (peer codereviews, pair programing, group bug-hunts, and so forth). Anticipatory, socially-savy quality control methods have success in highly constrained scenarios but work less well for systems operating in chaotic settings. Tellingly, the convention in software licensing exempts providers from any legal liability for bugs.

FUMBLY

Systems may be organized into discrete modules to avoid spaghetti-like tangles Systems may be organized into discrete modules to avoid spaghetti-like tangles of interdependencies. Each module can be deburgod, rewricked or swapped-out without having to fuss around much elsewhere. The modules then interface with each other through loose couplings, the metaphorical ties in the tangle. If taken too far, such arrangements can create fumbly systems. Highly modular systems decohere when losing sight of larger goals; full independence runs counter to what a system is. As systems decohere, unanticipated dysfunctions emerge from the fragmentation. New forms of kludge are used to cope, such as hardware adapters, translation layers, and triage routines. The connective ties are easy to maintain in theory. In practice, those ties often get neglected, caus-ing botched or cumbersome hand-offs. If different modules are controlled by factions with different interests, the ties can be curtailed to impair cooperation.

-_____ STUCK

Systems can get snagged, or unable to adapt to the times. To recoup an invest-ment, a system's life-cycle maybe extended too long. Some snags involve *lack-in* and *path dependence*. For example, customizations make a system difficult to upgrade or migrate away from. Proprietary technologies can create unhealthy dependence on external providers and add switching costs. A system may lack a diversified resource base, relying on only a few commodities, suppliers, or regions; too many eggs are placed in too few baskets, adding risk. Systems can also not caultoning transformer too few baskets, adding risk. Systems can also not caultoning transformer transformer to the system see t

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erode. Over-all performance suffers. If deprived long enough, starved systems will operate on the edge of break-down. There are three forms. First, so-called austerity measures are attempts to be frugal in the short-term but, rather than tim "fat," end up curtailing the management of long-term risk. Woreover, politi-cal entrenchment can matter more than functional necessity in cost-cutting decisions. Second, opponents of a system can "starw the beast" if they hold sway over resource allocations. Third, "lear" systems premised on "just-in-time" resource allocation lack fall-backs needed to cope with unforeseen disruptions.

BRITTLE Rrittl-

Britle systems are over-specified and exacting. There is little forgiveness for awkward variation, with minor anomalies causing major malfunctions. Think of brittle systems as strained threads, too taught to flex when necessary. Alypical cases (confluends) then cause the system to rais, it rais gracefully (or "safely"): not all functionality is lost; recovery is immediate with fall-backs in place to minimize damage and burden placed on everyone affected. Even better, systems "self heal" by automatically diagnosing the problem and setting things right. However, brittle systems lack that sort of fault tolerance, allowing small errors to cause major breakdown. Accordingly, a high-precision system with many intricate parts tends to either have high maintenance requirements or demand more control over operational conditi they need a pit-crew of fixers or have to be heavily insulated from stressors.

Q,

CONFLICTED Most systems contain Most systems contain trade-offs and tensions that have to be mitigated. Elegani designs manage conflict with ingenuity. Internal goal conflicts left unresolved can prevent a system from accomplishing its utilinate purpose. A system may internalize political conflict by turning it into administrative contradiction. For example, a governance system may subsidize tobacco farmers while running anti-smoking campaigns. It may rely on lottery revenues to combat gambling addiction. One activity may be a ploy to whitewash the other. More often, addictions do not want to favor one interest over another, so the system twists itself up to satisfy conflicting sides in ways that are self-defeating. Some times, the contradictions happen in obscure ways that only become apparent in particular circumstances. These *double binds* create "damned if you do, damne if you don't" options.¹⁶ Often, the only move left is to muddle through while maintaining the fraught pretense of system consistency



Modern society is speeding everything up with ever faster technologies and briefer technological life-cycles. Human-induced elective pressures in natural ecosystems are becoming ever more severe. Things do not last like they used to. At the same

Life is being ever more systematized: human-made systems condition and constrain a wider variety of social relations; daily tasks are more reliant on systems; systems intrude on our persona sphere more readily, including inside our

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
Different system sub-systems ch Different systems or sub-systems change in regular intervals of -----

Changes not due to

QUASI-PERIODIO em change appens at intervals at are not regular







SPACE SCALES

EXI C Extreme

scale and scope

From the vantage point of ordinary experbodies: less of nature is untouched b ience, the tangle of systems can appear stable due to human change blindness. human intervention. Thus, the **scope** or systems is also expanding. Most systems activity happens behind An overview of **generic levels of scale** are shown in the tables above. These provide an inkling of the scales that might be the scenes and far away, at sizes too small or too big to notice. We percieve change through a brief window of time relevant when analyzing systems. The with a shallow depth of focus. Our breakdown may not suit every analytical task, for not all levels listed will be memories are selective and degrade task, not not an evers listed win be relevant, plus many in-between levels might be. These tables invite us to con-sider methodically how systems (both separately and entangled) operate at different scales. Traditional approaches analysis fixate on a single scale (as with micro- and macro economics) and limit territories (such as regions). Understan ing system vulnerabilities holistically crouisne a vulnerabilities holistically quickly. We take emotional comfort from ontinuity. All told, we have little inclina tion and ability to keep track of all the moving parts. If we broaden our field of view and become better attuned to system rhythms, we discover that the system myrms, we biscover nait the tangle of systems is far from a steady state. It is continually writhing, with the occasional disjuncture. Even seemingly fixed and solid structures are always degrading under the forces of entropy without regular maintenance. Thus, every-thing is in **motion** (*nacess* ontogy), just not at time and spatial scales we are used to thinking in. requires a wider ranging attention that accounts for various scales and an extended scope of system activities

The Pattern Atlas' treatment \sim of scale also incorporates different *levels of aggrega tion*. The mess is made up various system entangle-ments, which in turn are which are made up of systems and subsystems, which are made up of routines and sub-routines. At low levels of aggregation, routines operate according to recurring patterns. As we move up the levels, the cyclical recurrence become harder to edict due to the complex. non-line dynamics. For the sake of highlighti particular types of vulner- ability, the Atlas s divided into four levels of scale. These are illustrated using four planes, with th

highlighted plane indicating the currer level. What these relative levels represe in absolute terms depends on the specifi tangles of systems being analyzed The growing scale and scope of entanglement are increases in vulner-ability in their own right. It is not always clear why all human activities have to t systemized or turned into systems with high-levels of entanglement. Managing vulnerability often involves setting new boundaries to nartition the surraw

CHANGE









NON-PERIODIC System change does not happen over periods that can be

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pace layers a



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NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES Name spateme have spill-over effects on other systems, not by accident but because of normal operations. A negative externally happens when the benefits of an activity are captured by an actor but the costs accure to others. Industrial pollution is an example of that sort of collisteral damage. The incentives favor continuing harms without some

sort of counter-balance or compensation. No large-scale human activity is without externalitie even though many will be mild. The mildness of harms is why most externalities persist. Yet gradual, low-key, diffuse side-effects may cause a lot of



CHRONIC DIFFICULTIES

Chronic difficulties may implicate muliple systems. The combined activities of systems may cause serious harw, or harm in particular circumstances, even if each system on its own is fairly benign. Combined effects can be hard to detect, attribute, and understand. The problem may be disputed, especially by those less affected. Unsatisfactori-ness that is too multi-faceted, fuzzy, contested, evolving, and sprawing to easily figure out gets called a 'wicked problem.⁴ If unified control over all the policy instruments in on tvalke, the problem is dubbed 'super-wicked' ⁴ Examples include poverty, oceanic plastic polution, and global warming. Tack-ling such problem as a unified effort entails enor-mous coordination conts The desired and-state mous coordination costs. The desired end-state may be hard to define to everyone's satisfaction.


problem maintenance


What counts as a full-blown "problem"? For psychologi-cal reasons, humans downplay harms and threats that are slow-boiling, far-removed, and abstract. Objective conditions are less important than the ability to sustain social drama around an issue of sharder relevance. A problem also has to be amenable to redress, otherwise it remains a "tragedy" to be lived with. Given the limited number of issues a society can care about at a time, framing what is a problem becomes a contest. In order to rouse the complacent and sustain attention, claims about the severity of the problem ratchet up: (a) threats are amplified; (b) a wider variety of issues are incorpor-ated into the problem definition (*concept creep*) to broaden the scope of concern; (c) competing concerns and downlewed (d) to an other definition. ated into the problem definition (concept creep) to broaden the scope of concern; (c). Competing concerns are downplayed; (d). counter-arguments are disparaged as dangerous forms of ignorance or malice. Thus, the process of problem maintenance often gives rise to crisis narratives. Meanwhile, all sorts of banal and unfashionable system vulnerabilities are neglected





TIME SCALES






ENTANGLEMENTS

[Cross-system dynamics]






THREADS
















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





examples













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
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


routine specification

REPETITION







FLEXIBILITY

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thank you

